Municipal Corporations—Zoning—Termination of Nonconforming Uses—\u3ci\u3eHoffman v. Kinealy\u3c/i\u3e, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1965) by Garton, William A.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 3 Article 13
1966
Municipal Corporations—Zoning—Termination
of Nonconforming Uses—Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389
S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1965)
William A. Garton
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
William A. Garton, Municipal Corporations—Zoning—Termination of Nonconforming Uses—Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.
App. 1965), 45 Neb. L. Rev. 636 (1966)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol45/iss3/13
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONIN-TEmvIINATION OF NON-
CONFORMING USES-Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.App.
1965).
Appellants owned land which had been used for the open stor-
age of lumber, building materials, and construction equipment
continuously since 1910. A 1950 municipal zoning ordinance re-
quired that the use of land within residential zones for purposes
of open storage be discontinued within six years. In 1962, upon
receiving notice to discontinue the use of the lots for open storage,
appellants applied for a certificate of occupancy of the lots for a
pre-existing nonconforming use, and their application was de-
nied. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed. Held,
that the provision of the zoning ordinance terminating the pre-ex-
isting nonconforming use by allowing six years to "amortize" such
use constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.
The termination of nonconforming uses' has become of prime
concern to city planners. 2 The Missouri court noted that noncon-
forming uses have not tended to eliminate themselves as had earlier
been expected 3 and conceded that a municipality has the power
through zoning ordinances to regulate the use of property prospec-
tively. But it reasoned that when a property owner exercises his
right to use his land in a legal manner, that right becomes
"vested" and cannot thereafter be taken away by use of an amor-
tization technique.4 The court stated that since the ordinance could
not require the termination 5 of the pre-existing nonconforming use
immediately, neither could it accomplish that result by delaying for
six years the deadline for termination. The court noted a distinc-
tion between prospective zoning and the termination of noncon-
forming uses, and implied that the distinction itself was controlling.
A different result was reached in the recent Nebraska case of
1 "Nonconforming use" refers to a continuous legal use of property from
a time prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance prohibiting that
use.
2 Moore, The Termination of Nonconforming Uses, 6 WMLIAM & MARY
L. REv. 1 (1965).
3 Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Mo. App. 1965). See also
Katarincic, Elimination of Non-conforming Uses, Buildings, and Struc-
tures by Amortization-Concept Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1963).
4 "Amortization" is the allowance of a number of years during which a
nonconforming use may continue, at the end of which the use must
terminate.
5 "Termination" as used herein refers to involuntary termination.
CASENOTES
Wolf v. City of Omaha.6 In that case a municipal ordinance re-
quired that all noncommercial dog kennels in districts zoned for
residences be removed within five years. Petitioners sought to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and were denied relief. On
appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed on the theory that
municipal zoning in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and
the general welfare is a proper exercise of the police power so long
as it "is not unreasonable, discriminatory, or arbitrary, and bears a
relationship to the purpose sought to be accomplished. 7  Thus
Hoffman and Wolf reflect apparently conflicting views on the
power to require amortization of nonconforming uses.
The power to zone prospectively was firmly established by the
United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,8 but that case left unanswered the question of the municipal
power to interfere with a pre-existing legal use. However, in
Reinman v. City of Little Rock 9 and Hadacheck v. Los Angeles' °
the Supreme Court held that a municipality may require the elimi-
nation of grossly obnoxious nonconforming uses,-1 notwithstanding
the great financial loss to the owner. In Hadacheck the Court said
that the police power is one of the most essential and least limitable
of governmental powers, and that "[a] vested interest cannot be
asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining."'1 2 The
police power may properly be exercised for the involuntary ter-
mination of certain enterprises in defined localities because of the
detriment to health and public welfare when conducted in those
localities.13 As the court pointed out, the businesses involved were
not nuisances per se but were merely classified as nuisances by the
legislature because they were located in residential zones. Thus,
the power to define and eliminate offensive uses is certainly
broader than the power to abate common law nuisances.
14
6 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).
7 Id. at 569-70, 129 N.W.2d at 515.
8 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
10 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
11 In Reinman, the nonconforming use was a livery stable in a residential
district; in Hadacheck, a brick kiln.
12 Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
13 Id. at 411.
14 Later, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88
(1926), the Court stated that in ascertaining the scope of the zoning
power, the law of nuisances may be referred to for purposes of analogy.
This also suggests that pre-existing uses may be eliminated, and that
the offensiveness of the use legislated against is an important consid-
eration in determining the constitutionality of the ordinance.
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There would seem to be at least three theories on which
Reinman and Hadacheck might be explained: (1) the municipal
power to terminate nonconforming uses extends to all cases in
which the use might be said to approximate a common law nui-
sance, notwithstanding private financial loss, but not to cases in
which the offensiveness of the nonconforming use is not this great,
(2) the power extends to all cases in which it might be said that
termination is in some way desirable, notwithstanding private fi-
nancial loss, or (3) the power extends to cases in which the public
benefit derived from termination is sufficient to "outweigh" the
private financial loss that it causes.
The first theory has clearly been repudiated in a number of
jurisdictions. 15 The second theory was apparently adopted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, when in an early line of cases it held
that a pre-existing ladies' clothing store,16 a grocery store,1 7 and a
drug store' could be eliminated from residential zones under a
zoning ordinance. The court conceded that these uses could not
be considered obnoxious in the ordinary sense, 9 but stated that
their mere presence in contravention of the ordinance constituted
them sufficiently a nuisance to make their elimination a proper
exercise of the police power.20  The result of these cases is that
whatever a city may accomplish by zoning in advance, it may
accomplish by zoning after the uses have been established. The
severe2' and widespread 22 criticism to which these cases have been
subjected is indicative of a general feeling that some distinction
should be made between the power to zone prospectively and the
power to terminate nonconforming uses. Thus it is submitted that
the third theory accounts for most of the recent decisions in this
area.
Since a termination ordinance, like a prospective zoning ordi-
15 See, e.g., notes 25, 28, 35 infra.
16 City of New Orleans v. Liberty Shop Ltd., 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798
(1924).
17 State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
18 State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
19 A clothing store "could hardly be regarded as a nuisance anywhere
except in an exclusive residence neighborhood where business estab-
lishments are proscribed by statute or ordinance." City of New
Orleans v. Liberty Shop Ltd., 157 La. 26, 27, 101 So. 798, 799 (1924).
20 Id. at 27, 101 So. at 799.
21 See Fratcher, Constitutional Law-Zoning Ordinances Prohibiting Re-
pair of Existing Structures, 35 MICH. L. REV. 642, 644 (1937).
22 "These cases have not been cited with frequency by individuals favor-
ing the amortization theory." Katarincic, supra note 3, at 21.
CASENOTES
nance, is an exercise of the police power, the test of its constitu-
tionality is its "reasonableness." But whereas the reasonableness
of a prospective zoning ordinance depends upon its design,23 the
reasonableness of a termination ordinance apparently depends up-
on its operation: It is reasonable if it operates to produce a pub-
lic benefit which is greater than the private financial loss which it
causes.2 4 In City of Seattle v. Martin,25 where the Supreme Court
of Washington upheld an ordinance as applied to require the ter-
mination within one year of a nonconforming repair lot for con-
struction equipment, the court stated that the test of constitution-
ality is "whether the significance of the hardship as to appellant
is more compelling, or whether it reasonably over-balances the
benefit which the public would derive from the termination of
the use of the vacant lot as a place for the repair of construction
equipment.1
26
It can be said that in nearly all of the cases in which a ter-
mination ordinance has been upheld the public benefit overbal-
anced the private loss. 27 The leading case of City of Los Angeles v.
Gage,28 where the court sustained the validity of an ordinance re-
quiring termination within five years as applied to the owner of a
nonconforming plumbing business,29 may be explained in terms of
a balancing test by saying that in light of the legislative deter-
mination that termination of the use would be desirable, the court
was precluded from saying that the use was in no way detrimen-
23 "If ... there was evidence upon which the city commission could have
said that the zoning ordinance in question was necessary in considera-
tion of public health, safety, comfort or general welfare, it is beyond
the province of the court to say that it is unreasonable ...." Cassel
Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 753, 760, 14 N.W.2d 600, 604
(1944).
2-4 For a possible explanation of this distinction, see text accompanying
notes 49-51 infra.
25 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
26 Id. at 544, 342 P.2d 604.
27 But see Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950), allowing termination of a
nearly new filling station located near the state capitol and a public
school.
28 127 Cal. App.2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
29 The use consisted of a building adaptable for residential purposes and
an unimproved lot used for the open storage of supplies. Reversing
the trial court's decision that the ordinance was invalid as applied to
Gage, the court said that the legislative body has the power to adopt
"reasonable" regulations to make zoning effective. But the important
question is, what test of "reasonableness" is to be used? The court
said that "constitutionality depends on the relative importance to be
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tal.30 And since the loss to Gage was small,3 ' it would be justified
in order to realize the benefit of termination. This analysis is rein-
forced by the later California case of City of LaMesa v. Tweed &
Gambrell Planing Mill,32 where an ordinance requiring termina-
tion within five years of nonconforming industrial property with a
remaining economic life of twenty-one years was held unconstitu-
tional. The court distinguished Gage on the ground that "in this
case not only is the private loss greater than in the Gage case, but
the public gain is less."3 3 Here the test of reasonableness used by
the court was obviously that of balancing the public and private
interests.
34
In Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore35 the losses sus-
tained when billboards were amortized under an ordinance requir-
ing elimination within five years were inconsequential, since the
practice of the billboard company was to amortize billboards over a
five-year period anyway. In Harbison v. City of Buffalo36 the
court remanded a case under a termination ordinance to ascertain
whether the loss to the property owners would be sufficiently re-
duced within the three-year amortization period to justify termina-
tion at that time. The court indicated that elimination would be
constitutional if "the benefit to the public has been deemed of
greater moment than the detriment to the property owner .. .-37
Subsequent New York cases have allowed termination where the
public benefit outweighed private loss,38 and disallowed it where it
did not.39
given to the public gain and to the private loss." Id. at 460, 274 P.2d
44. This language definitely implies a balancing test.
30 The court also noted that the noise and disturbance caused by a plumb-
ing business is greater than the noise and disturbance that is normal
in residential districts. Id. at 449, 274 P.2d at 37.
31 The loss was "less than half of 1% of the mean of his gross business
for five years." Id. at 461, 274 P.2d at 44.
32 146 Cal. App.2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956).
33 Id. at 770, 304 P.2d at 808.
34 See also McCaslin v. City of Monterey Park, 163 Cal. App.2d 339, 329
P.2d 522 (1958), where termination of mining operations within 60
days was not allowed.
35 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
36 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
37 Id. at 559, 152 N.E.2d at 44.
38 See People v. Bannett, 40 Misc. 2d 296, 243 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1963); Town
of Schroeppel v. Spector, 43 Misc. 2d 290, 251 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1963).
39 See Town of Hempstead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226 N.Y.S.2d 291
(1962); Dolomite Prod. Co. v. Kipers, 42 Misc. 2d 11, 247 N.Y.S.2d 396
(1964).
CASENOTES
In Wolf v. City of Omaha,40 the court seemed to base its deci-
sion on testimony which indicated that certain of the kennels in-
volved created noise, odor, and sanitation problems and that the
kennels were not to be considered a source of income for their
owners. The court could therefore conclude that the detriment to
surrounding areas caused by the presence of the kennels, and there-
fore the public good to be served by their removal, was sufficient
to justify the possible burden to the owners.41
On the other hand, Hoffman seems to be a case in which the
public benefit did not justify the loss to appellants.42 There it ap-
pears the offensiveness of the nonconforming use was slight,43
termination would have resulted in substantial loss to the owner,
44
and the allowance of an amortization period did not operate to
effectively reduce loss to the point at which it was justifiable.45
Thus even the amortization provision could not save the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance as applied to appellant. While the court
did not purport to employ this analysis, perhaps it is comparable to
the one used in the case. "Taking" a "vested right" may in this
context be equated with "causing financial loss," for there is no
apparent reason for protecting a "vested right" exercised in con-
40 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).
41 Under this analysis Wolf v. City of Omaha does not give unqualified
approval to the use of the amortization technique for the termination
of all nonconforming uses. But where a use is detrimental to the
public health, and the termination of that use within five years does
not impose any substantial burden upon the owner, such termination
is a valid exercise of the police power.
42 Courts usually do not allow termination where the public benefit is
less than the loss to property owners. See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi
v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953). See also, cases cited
note 39 supra.
43 The nonconforming lots were enclosed with a high fence to exclude
children and were "'landscaped' with a hedge or shrubbery." Hoff-
man v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1965). There did not
appear to be any unusual noise, dust, or annoying lights in connection
with the use.
44 It appears that to require termination of the use would have forced
appellant either to relocate his entire business, located nearby, or to
acquire different land for the storage of his materials. "[Tihe record
adequately shows that instant relators' use of their lots may not be
brushed aside and disregarded as 'relatively slight and insubstantial."'
Id. at 754.
45 The unimproved lots would not depreciate naturally, as would a build-
ing, and no real benefit was derived on the theory that appellant had
a monopoly in the area. Appellant's loss would theoretically be the
same at the end of the amortization period as it would be if the termi-
nation were immediate, thus, the court's description of the amortiza-
tion as a "postponed taking."
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travention of public policy unless financial loss would otherwise
result. If the rule of the case is "an arbitrary interference by the
government, or by its authority, with the reasonable enjoyment of
private lands" is unconstitutional,46 perhaps the termination of a
use that has qualities of nuisance, though it not be a nuisance per
se,47 would not be prohibited: The interference would not be
"arbitrary," but based upon sound and substantial reasons of pub-
lic health, safety, or welfare.4
On this basis, Hoffman can be reconciled with other termina-
tion cases. But the decision is significant in at least two respects.
First, it points out that there is a distinction between prospective
zoning and terminating nonconforming uses. Perhaps the distinc-
tion is based upon the fact that under a prospective zoning ordi-
nance, the public benefit is future and therefore contingent. The
benefit lies in an "immunization" against potentially serious detri-
ment to public health, safety, and welfare. This, coupled with the
fact that the "immunization" cannot be effected without adversely
affecting some property values,49 has made the courts understand-
ably hesitant to declare that private financial loss will be a con-
trolling consideration in determining the constitutionality of the
ordinance. 50 But under a termination ordinance, the detriments
legislated against are present, and may therefore be assessed in-
dividually to determine whether the benefit of elimination justifies
the cost. Here the courts would not have to say that the design of
the ordinance is unreasonable, only that its effect in a particular
case is unreasonable. In weighing the relative public benefit and
private loss, the court does not decide whether the legislature was
reasonable in declaring the desirability of elimination,51 but only
whether the stated desirability of elimination is sufficiently great to
justify the private loss incurred. For these reasons courts should
closely scrutinize the attempted application of a termination ordi-
nance to determine whether, in that case, termination is justifiable.
Hoffman, if the case may properly be read in terms of the
40 Id. at 753.
47 As discussed in Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915),
and Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
48 The basis of this argument is that the court said a "vested right" is
protected by the Constitution, but did not say the protection is un-
limited.
49 389 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo. App. 1965).
5O See note 23 supra.
51 "What is the public good as it relates to zoning ordinances affecting the
use of property is, primarily, a matter lying within the discretion and
determination of the municipal body .... ." Wolf v. City of Omaha,
177 Neb. 545, 556, 129 N.W.2d 501, 508 (1964).
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analysis presented above, also indicates that provision for an amor-
tization period, even a very long one, might not make termination
permissible where a balancing test is used. The amortization pe-
riod is significant only insofar as it allows a minimization of loss to
the extent that the loss finally sustained will not justify the con-
tinued presence of the nonconforming use. Of course, the advan-
tage of having a monopoly in the neighborhood during the amortiza-
tion period should be considered in determining the amount by
which loss is reduced.
52
A balancing test is not always easy to apply, but it seems to be
the only way to do substantial justice in resolving conflicts between
the rights of property owners and the right of the community to
enact effective zoning ordinances to promote the health, safety, and
general welfare of its citizens. The legislative determination that
elimination is desirable should be controlling where the loss to the
property owner is negligible.53 Where the loss to the property
owner is significant, so must it also appear that, for reasons more
compelling than the mere legislative determination of desirability,
the city is attempting to protect its citizens from a real and sub-
stantial detriment, if the city is to succeed in terminating the non-
conforming use.54 Use of an amorization provision is a tool which
in many cases will permit the owner to reduce his losses to the point
at which they will be justifiable in light of the benefit the com-
munity will derive from the termination of the nonconforming
use.5 The advantage of using a balancing test is that it gives the
property owner a degree of protection which he would not have
were he precluded from a real judgment on the merits by an almost
unassailable presumption that the ordinance as applied to him is
"reasonable." Yet it allows a city to eliminate the most offensive
nonconforming uses, and even those which are not so offensive
where the loss to the owner is slight. This it could not do if
"vested rights" were to be given unlimited protection. It is sub-
mitted that Hoffman is a worthy decision only insofar as it recog-
nizes that both interests are deserving of judicial recognition.
William A. Garton '67
52 See Moore, The Termination of Noncomforming Uses, 6 WLLiAm &
MARY L. REV. 1, 9 (1965).
53 E.g., Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964); City
of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App.2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); Grant
v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
G4 City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
55 It is submitted that the termination itself should be the measure of
public benefit, and a beneficial use to which the land could be put
should not be considered in determining public benefit. But see 35
WAsH. L. Rnv. 213, 219 (1960).
